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Abstract 
 
The author revisits the strategy of trading S&P 500 index re-compositions under the 
pre- and post-crisis financial environments, proving that the return structure has 
significantly changed. The results show for the first time, that there are currently no 
tradable abnormal returns between announcement and event dates in the post-crisis 
sample period, indicating smoother rebalancing mechanisms by bank’s client facing 
desks and better services for passive end-investors. The newly added firms inflate the 
S&P 500 index by less than 10 basis points per year.  The results could be attributed 
to improved execution algorithms used by the banks, and potentially to the new 
regulatory reforms in the sector, which prevents financial institutions from taking 
large trading positions with their balance sheets.  
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Following the global credit crisis and the near collapse of the banking system, 
regulators and policymakers forced significant change upon the banking industry. 
Proprietary businesses once intertwined amongst customer facing businesses were no 
longer permitted within investment banks and were forced to find a different sponsor 
on the buy side. Predominantly hedge funds converted this liquidity pool, resulting in 
an unchanged supply to the investment managers. The customer facing businesses 
now left to bridge their short fall in revenue, aggressively sold direct market access 
products to many of the passive investment managers in house traders, making 
execution impact far more efficient. 
 
This study revisits the strategy of trading S&P 500 index re-compositions under the 
new financial environment, that have historically been perceived as profit making 
opportunities by banks and active traders. After taking into consideration overnight 
and intra-day abnormal returns, this work analyses the price effects of S&P 500 index 
additions and the magnitude of the inflated index level, following a change in the 
constituents, on a yearly basis. Although the story of buying adds and selling deletes 
is far from new, the return structure has transformed significantly post the financial 
crisis and the regulation changes. Results show for the first time that tradable returns 
are non-existent following October 2008, and in contrast to previous research 
findings, there are currently no available profit opportunities. An important finding is 
that there are no abnormal returns during the date of event, indicating better index 
rebalancing services for passive end-clients. S&P 500 index re-compositions cost less 
than 10 basis points per year to the end-investor on average.  
 
The diminished effects of index rebalancing are unarguably a result of better market 
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knowledge by market participants. In particular, stock analysts may have become 
better at predicting the stocks involved in the index re-compositions (although in the 
case of S&P500, the rebalancing dates are not known in advance), and program 
trading desks may have improved their algorithm execution services, providing better 
market stability for the index and its new constituents. Moreover, the fact that the 
results are insignificant post the crisis could also support the argument that the new 
regulatory reforms may have helped in preventing financial institutions from taking 
large trading positions with their balance sheets. As a consequence, any potential 
conflict of interest that perhaps may have existed between client facing desks and 
end-investors during index-rebalancing periods is now eliminated. 
 
The above results are good news for the passive community, proving a price 
discovery mechanism far more efficient than before, with negligible profits for 
arbitrageurs and mild effects on the overall index level. The findings of this study are 
in line with the rapid regulatory changes in banking infrastructure.  
 
 
Index announcement policies 
 
The aim of trading index re-compositions is to benefit from a price increase in the 
added stock and a price decrease in the deleted stock following the event however, the 
trading strategy depends on the announcement policy of the index provider. There are 
generally two types of announcement policies; the first one involves index changes 
whose event dates are pre-determined. The rebalancing dates are known to the 
market, (e.g. those of FTSE, Russell, and MSCI indices, amongst others) and the aim 
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is to anticipate the names of the stocks involved in the change, and take the relevant 
positions well before the event.  For this type of announcement policy, the criteria for 
becoming an index member are well defined and made publicly available. In the case 
of FTSE 100 rebalances for example, where the main criterion is the company’s 
capitalization, the anticipation of the event is a simple issue.  Consequently, the 
market is well prepared for these events and the edge of the trader is limited. The 
second category involves indices, whose constitution is subject to change at any point 
in time, whenever necessary. The Standard and Poor’s indices follow this policy and 
as a result, events are much more difficult to anticipate and criteria for addition to the 
index could be subjective, resulting to a more “opaque” process. This study relates to 
the second category of index announcement policy. 
 
 
The history of S&P index re-compositions 
 
The “S&P Game”, as Beneish and Whaley have successfully characterized it in 1997, 
has its roots back in 1976; prior to that date, information about S&P 500 re-
composition events was only occasional1 and reported to the “S&P Outlook”. After 
1976, the index providers initiated the Overnight Notification Service, which allowed 
subscribers to be notified about index re-compositions the evening of the day that the 
change was decided, and the change taking place the following day. To alleviate 
significant price pressures on the stocks involved, the index committee changed the 
announcement policy again in 1989, and changes were pre-announced an average of 
five days before the event date.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Index changes were published every three to six months. The Wall Street Journal published index 
compositions very rarely. 
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The above changes and the fact that the committee takes into account a set of other 
factors (e.g. financial stability, sector representation, trading activity and free float 
amongst others) made the anticipation of events far more challenging. Companies that 
meet the criteria are entered in the Replacement Pool, a pre-selected list of firms 
eligible for addition. Entering the Pool does not guarantee entry to the S&P 500 and 
firms may be removed if they no longer meet the criteria. The reason for a rebalance 
is mainly caused by the fact that a firm needs to be deleted, which is why the previous 
literature has been mostly concentrated on added companies. The sample of deletions 
is almost always biased by other events, including restructuring, bankruptcy, merger 
and acquisition, making it difficult to collect a sample of “pure” deletions, i.e. with 
the addition being the driver (reason) of the re-composition event rather than the 
deletion. Hence, the findings of this work are exclusively focusing on additions to the 
index. 
 
 
Selected previous findings 
 
Due to the advent of index tracking which has its roots in 1976, index-rebalancing 
events were under close scrutiny, and their effects have been analyzed across the 
world. The S&P 500 index effect has been historically the most attractive, not only 
due to the nature of the announcement policy, but also due to the enormous amount of 
assets tied to the index.  
 
Beneish and Whaley (1996) were the first to examine the effects of the new 
announcement policy that took place in 1989 and allowed for an average five-day 
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window between announcement and event. They found a permanent price increase of 
circa 4%, with the average increase being greater under the new announcement 
policy. It was apparent that profitable opportunities aroused for active traders, who 
were buying the stock on announcement date and selling it at a premium to index fund 
managers on event date. Index funds generally prefer to wait until the change 
becomes effective, in order to minimize their tracking error. The more the money tied 
to the index, the more the potential for high returns due to increased trading volume, 
causing a larger price effect. As Pruitt and Wei proved in 1989, there is a positive 
relation between the abnormal return on the day after announcement and the net 
change in institutional ownership.  
 
While there is a consistent strain of literature that has thoroughly proven significant 
price and volume effects following S&P 500 index changes, the theories underlying 
the reasons of these effects are different, depending on whether the price and trading 
volume increases are temporary or permanent, the module used for estimation of 
abnormal returns and the different sample period. Previous findings are in support of 
five different hypotheses about the price (and volume) performance of the firms 
involved in an index re-composition event; the Price Pressure Hypothesis supporting 
temporary changes in price and trading volume (Harris and Gurel, 1986), the 
Imperfect Substitutes/Downward-Sloping Demand Curve for Stocks Hypothesis 
supporting permanent changes in prices and temporary changes in trading volume 
(Shleifer, 1986), the Information Content Hypothesis supporting permanent changes 
in prices and temporary changes in trading volume (Dhillon and Johnson, 1991), the 
Liquidity Cost Hypothesis arguing for permanent changes in prices and trading 
volume (Edmister et al, 1994 and 1996) and the Market Segmentation/Investor 
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Recognition Hypothesis assuming asymmetric effects between additions and deletions 
(Chen et al, 2004). 
 
The impact of index re-compositions has also been examined worldwide and for 
indices such as the FTSE 100 (Mazouz and Saadouni, 2007), the MSCI (Chakrabarti 
et al, 2002), the NIKKEI 225 (Liu, 2006), the TSE (Kaul et al, 2000), the Russell 
2000 (Madhavan, 2003), the DAX (Deininger et al, 2000), the AEX (Doeswijk, 2005) 
and the DJIA (Beneish and Gardner, 1995). Recent work has also looked at the social 
index effect by looking at the effects of KLD MSCI Social index re-compositions to 
prove whether investors are sensitive about social responsibility and whether this is 
reflected in their investments (Kappou and Oikonomou, 2016).  
 
The purpose of this study is neither to establish evidence for one of the 
aforementioned hypotheses, nor to examine long-term firm performance in general. 
The focus of this work is to answer three important questions; first, to determine 
whether the strategy of trading S&P 500 additions is still lucrative for proprietary 
desks or other active market participants, assuming there is no anticipation or 
speculation of the upcoming events (i.e. that a trading position is originated after the 
announcement of the event). Second, to establish to what extent the 2008 financial 
meltdown, better execution algorithms and regulatory reforms may have affected the 
trading behavior of banks’ client facing desks during rebalancing periods, and hence 
improved market efficiency and passive end-investor services. Third, to ascertain the 
hidden cost of “being passive”, by looking at the level that the newly added firms 
inflate the index on a yearly basis, due to their better stock price performance just 
before their inclusion in the S&P 500. 
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The following section analyses the specifics of the trading strategy around the event 
window, given the timing of addition announcement and the period until the actual 
event, assuming no anticipation of the upcoming index re-composition.  
 
 
The S&P 500 re-composition event window 
 
The S&P index committee announces future index re-compositions on the Standard 
and Poor’s website. The press release is out after the market close, making it 
impossible for market participants to trade immediately, i.e. in the evening of the 
announcement date (AD). The first potential trading opportunity takes place in the 
morning of the day after (AD+1). Therefore, a calculation of a close-to-close 
abnormal return from AD to AD+1 would be irrelevant to active traders, since only 
the open-to-close abnormal return of AD+1 is tradable. The actual index change takes 
place on the event date (ED), which follows on average five days after announcement. 
The change becomes effective at the close of business of the event date, and the S&P 
trades under its new composition in the morning of the day after (ED+1). The so-
called “S&P Game” assumes that arbitrageurs can benefit from index re-
compositions, by buying the added stock just after announcement and selling it to the 
index funds on the effective date.  
 
Measuring abnormal return performance on a market close-to-market close basis 
cannot show whether active traders can achieve profits by trading the added stocks 
around the event period. This can only be determined if the analysis includes intraday 
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(and overnight) stock price performance. Although previous research has extensively 
covered the effects of additions and deletions to the S&P 500 on price and trading 
volume, there were only a few studies that focused on tradable returns.  
 
Beneish and Whaley (1996 and 2002) examined overnight returns for two different 
sub-periods to measure the part of the stock price increase that is non-tradable. They 
reported an increase in the overnight performance from the evening of announcement 
date (AD) until the morning of the day after (AD+1 open). For the first sub-period the 
overnight return was 2.46% with an intraday return the day after of -0.6% and for the 
second sub-period the overnight return increased to 5.84%, whereas the intraday 
return of the day after decreased to -0.85%. Despite the fact that there were no 
positive tradable abnormal returns during the first day after announcement, there was 
an abnormal return between announcement and event of approximately 5%. 
 
More than a decade later, Kappou et al (2010), shed light not only to overnight 
returns, which were of similar levels to those of Beneish and Whaley, but also to tick-
by-tick abnormal returns and trading volumes, which were examined for the first time 
in the S&P 500 index effect literature. More specifically, they defined a trading 
strategy by taking the relevant short and long positions in the added companies 
resulting in a profit of 7% on average (excluding transaction costs). 
 
This study revisits the above findings in light of the new market developments post 
the financial crisis, that have affected the activity of proprietary traders and banks’ 
client facing desks. First, an analysis of close-to-close, intraday and overnight 
abnormal returns presents the current effects on price performance and tradable 
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profits around index re-compositions. Second, the sample is split into two sub-periods 
to establish whether the financial crisis followed by the new regulatory reforms has 
affected trading behavior and market efficiency. Third, this work measures the extent 
by which the S&P 500 index is inflated by the newly added stocks through time, 
before passive investors have the opportunity to invest in the new index composition. 
 
Methodology and Data 
 
Methodology 
The effects of S&P re-compositions have been historically measured by event study 
methodologies using daily data. Previous research has been using various forms of 
abnormal return calculations during the period where the event takes place (also 
referred to as event window). A common method refers to Market Risk-Adjusted 
Returns. The systematic risk-adjusted model is similar to a one-factor model and 
assumes that all firms linearly depend on the market portfolio. The model parameters 
are calculated based on an estimation period taken from a sample of data outside the 
event window, either before or after the event, or a combination of the two.  The 
Market Risk-Adjusted approach has been adapted in the studies of Goetzmann and 
Garry (1986), Harris and Gurel (1986), Shleifer (1986), Lamoureux and Wansley 
(1987), Jain (1987), Dhillon and Johnson (1991), Edmister et al (1994), Erwin and 
Miller (1998) and Malkiel and Radisich (2001). 
 
Another method of calculating abnormal returns is the Market Adjusted Return 
approach, where the stock’s abnormal return is regarded as the difference between the 
stock’s return and that of the benchmark on a given trading day. This is a more 
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straightforward process and relies on the assumption that the systematic risk of all 
stocks are equal to unity, and is adopted in this study for the following four reasons; 
firstly, the S&P 500 members are companies of very large market capitalization in 
line with the index inclusion criteria. It would be therefore expected that their 
systematic risk would be very close to unity2. Secondly, due to the fact that an 
analysis is also performed based on open-to-close and overnight abnormal returns, 
obtaining two sets of coefficients for each type of abnormal return would complicate 
the results without adding any valuable benefits. Thirdly, there is evidence of bias in 
the selection of the estimation period in order to obtain the regression coefficients, 
including the problem of non-stationary bias and the fact that firms are likely to 
perform well before the event, amongst others (see Jain, 1987).  Lastly, the Market 
Adjusted approach has been used by a plethora of studies (see Woolridge and Ghosh, 
1986; Beneish and Whaley, 1996 and 1997; Cusick, 2002; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 
2002; Chen et al, 2004).   
 
Data 
Data of all the names, announcement and event dates were obtained by Standard and 
Poor’s corporation from January 2002 until November 2013. Out of a total of 276 
firms, 16 were removed due to lack of data and 32 were excluded, as they were not 
considered pure additions for two reasons; they were either a result of a break up of 
an existing index member company or of a reconstruction of the original company. If 
these firms were included, other effects than that of index membership could have 
affected price performance. The final sample consists of 228 additions. The data are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 To support this argument, a calculation of betas using a single-index model  and a post-event 
estimation period of 1-year (following the method of Jain,1987), shows that the average level of the 
added firms’ systematic risk is 1.16. 
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also split into two different sub-periods for further analysis before and after October 
20083. Stock and index closing and opening prices adjusted for dividends and 
corporate actions are obtained from Reuters. 
 
An analysis is performed based on the construction of a short and long term event 
window. The short-term event window refers to the period from three weeks before 
the event (15 trading days) until four weeks after the event (20 trading days), whereas 
the long-term event window ends one year (252 trading days) after the event. Close-
to-close and open-to-close abnormal returns are calculated using market-adjusted 
returns, as follows: 
      
ARCTCit  = RCTCit - RCTCmt  (1)
    
where ARCTCi is the security’s close-to close abnormal return at a particular time t, 
RCTCi is its realised ex post close-to-close return and RCTCm  is the market’s (S&P 500) 
ex-post realised close-to-close return at that time t.  
 
The close-to-close abnormal returns for all firms are then averaged against the total 
number of inclusion announcements N, for each day t of the event window as: 
 
AARCTCt = 1
N
ARCTCit
i=1
N
∑  (2) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 October 2008 is considered the most appropriate date to divide the sample given the series of 
financial events (Lehman bankrupty, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac take over by the US governement, 
and Merill Lynch take over by Bank of America) 
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where AARCTCt is the average close-to-close abnormal return on day t,  t = AD-15 to 
ED+20 for the short-term event window, and t = AD-15 to ED+252 for the long-term 
event window.  
 
The t-statistics are reported for all daily abnormal returns and are defined by: 
 
t  stat = AARCTCt
Sˆ(AARCTCt) / N
 (3) 
 
where AARCTCi is the average close-to-close abnormal return on day t and Sˆ(AARCTCt)  
is the standard deviation of the abnormal returns on day t. 
 
Accordingly, the open-to-close abnormal return (OTC) is obtained by subtracting the 
open-to-close performance of the stock from that of the S&P 500 index at each 
trading day. The overnight abnormal return (OVAR) is then derived by subtracting 
the open-to-close abnormal performance from the close-to-close abnormal 
performance, as shown in the following equations:     
      
 = it it mtOTC OTC OTCAR R - R         (4)  
 
OVARit = ARCTCit - AROTCit         (5) 
 
where, in the case of the e.g. first day after the S&P press release, RCTCit and RCTCmt 
are the close-to-close returns between announcement day (AD) and the following day 
(AD+1) for the stock and the S&P 500 respectively, ROTCit and ROTCmt are the open-to-
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close returns between AD+1 open and AD+1 close for the stock and the benchmark 
respectively, ARCTCit, AROTCit are the close-to-close and open-to-close abnormal 
returns for each stock, respectively, and OVARit is the overnight (non-tradable) 
abnormal return between AD close and AD+1 open for each firm. This date is of 
particular interest, as it reflects the efficiency of the market to reflect the increase in 
the price of the newly added firm, affecting the opportunity of tradable profits. 
 
Although stocks belonging to the S&P 500 are large value stocks with significant 
trading activity and efficient price discovery, it is important to note that opening 
prices need to be treated with caution, as they may not always reflect accurate 
estimates of the stock’s current value and potentially affect the robustness of the 
findings. Opening prices experience higher volatility and a more negative 
autocorrelation pattern than closing prices, after taking into account information 
arrivals (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987 , Stoll and Whaley, 1990). This behavior may 
be attributed to traders overreacting to overnight information by trading quickly upon 
the market open and pushing prices away from their fundamental levels (Kim, 2013).  
 
Abnormal performance between announcement and event 
According to the rules of the S&P 500 index Committee, changes are preannounced at 
an average of five days before the actual event. In the 2002-2013 sample, the shortest 
period between announcement date and effective date is one day (i.e. the event takes 
place the day following announcement) and the longest is twenty-seven days. As the 
number of firms with more than seven days between announcement and event 
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radically diminishes, the daily average firm performance is not reported in the 
exhibits beyond AD+7.4   
 
Transaction Costs 
The above estimations of abnormal returns do not include transaction costs. Trading 
costs reflect the price impact of executing a transaction and depend on the type of the 
market, liquidity of stocks and timing of trades. Kappou et al 2010, argue that bid-ask 
spreads tend to be wider at the market close than during the trading day. In their study 
of S&P 500 index additions for the period 1999-2000 using tick-by-tick data, they 
found that the bid-ask spread as a percentage of the mid-price was 45bps on average if 
calculated at the close, and only 12bps if calculated during the day. Based on these 
findings, the abnormal returns of this study could be affected by approximately up to 
45 basis points for a round trip transaction (buy and sell) if trading costs were taken 
into account. 
 
 
Results 
 
An analysis of the price effects following addition to the S&P 500 is presented in 
Exhibit I. Close-to-close abnormal returns are reported from fifteen trading days 
before the event announcement until four weeks after the actual event. There is no 
evidence of significant abnormal returns before announcement, apart from a marginal 
average price increase of 0.36% four days before. This result may suggest that the 
market may have not anticipated the event, consistent to the fact that S&P 500 re-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 There are only 10 firms in the sample that were added to the index more than 7 days following 
announcement. 
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composition dates are not known in advance. Another potential explanation could be 
that trading volume has absorbed any speculative pre-event activity or that trading has 
taken place well before the event with no market impact, or both of the above.  
 
The first significant price jump takes place on the first day after announcement 
(AD+1) and is of the magnitude of 3.01%, which is highly significant. Following this 
date, there are no further significant abnormal returns, apart from the date that the 
event is effective (ED). Particularly, by the close of business of the event date (ED), 
there is a highly significant abnormal return of 0.53%, indicating a price pressure 
potentially caused by index fund rebalancing over the last minutes of the trading day 
and/or the orders of the closing auction (see Kappou et al, 2010). Following this date, 
there is a series of negative returns for at least one month after the event, 
demonstrating a price reversal. The negative returns are statistically significant only 
on days ED+4 and ED+12. The reversal fully offsets the price increase that was 
accumulated since the date of announcement, resulting to the overall price effect 
being considered negligible.  
 
When looking at the average long-term firm performance (Exhibit II), the average 
cumulative abnormal returns are of particular interest. There is a clear price reversal 
over the period of three months after inclusion, indicating that the importance of S&P 
500 index membership, previously considered as a seal of approval, is now 
insignificant. The S&P index committee always argued that addition to the S&P 500 
should not be treated as information about the future prosperity of the firms however, 
the market has historically treated these events as evidence of superior future 
performance (see Jain, 1987, Jacques, 1988 and Denis et al, 2003).  
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The above results are very different to those of previous studies. In particular, 
previous research (conducted using older samples/different time periods) reports 
significant abnormal performance not only on the first day after announcement, but 
also between announcement and event, allowing active traders to achieve profits at 
the expense of index trackers. Beneish and Whaley (1996) estimate an abnormal 
return of 2.52% from the close of AD+1 until the close of ED, while Kappou et al 
(2010) report a significant return of 4.3%.   
 
The second part of the results refers to the intraday and overnight abnormal 
performance for the whole sample and for two sub-periods, before and after the 
financial crisis. Exhibit III illustrates the short-term event window with close-to-close, 
open-to-close and overnight abnormal returns for the whole sample. It can be seen 
that the open-to-close abnormal return on the first day after announcement (AD+1) is 
negative and reaches -0.22%, a figure that is statistically insignificant. This indicates 
that all the price increase took place overnight, with an overnight abnormal return of 
3.23% (i.e. from the close of announcement date (AD close) until the morning after 
(AD+1 morning)). In other words, an overnight abnormal return of 3.23% together 
with an open-to-close abnormal return of -0.22% constitutes the 3.01% close-to-close 
abnormal return, that was reported in the previous analysis.  
 
When looking at the two sub-samples (Exhibits IV and V) the pattern is similar for 
the pre-2008 sub-period with almost all the abnormal return taking place overnight 
(3.21%), and a negligible intraday positive performance on AD+1 (0.07%). When 
looking at the post-2008 sub-period, the overnight return still constitutes the major 
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part of the abnormal return (3.25%) but this time with a significant intraday price 
reversal on AD+1 (-0.62%). All the above indicate important evidence of market 
efficiency and negligible tradable profits on the first day following announcement.  
 
When looking at each of the dates beyond AD+1, the close-to-close abnormal 
performance although insignificant for the whole sample (Exhibit III), is positive for 
the pre-2008 sample and negative for the post-2008 sample. Moreover, the close-to-
close average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from AD+2 until AD+7 presented 
in Exhibit VI confirm that firm performance beyond AD+1 and before ED was 
significantly positive for the pre-2008 period, whereas it was negative and 
insignificant for the post-2008 period. This is an important finding and indicates that 
the S&P Game has become less popular after the crisis, and it is not causing further 
price pressures following announcement. Furthermore, the calculation of overnight 
and open-to-close abnormal returns confirms that the strategy of simply buying the 
added stock in the morning following the announcement date and selling it at the 
close of business of the event date does not generate any significant returns any 
longer.  
 
The final date, which is of particular interest, is the event date (ED), as stocks have 
historically experienced price pressure specifically because of index fund rebalancing. 
In previous studies, the abnormal return of this date was always statistically 
significant (e.g. 1.67% reported by Beneish and Whaley (1996) and 2.18% by Kappou 
et al (2010)) and in fact, there was evidence that trading pressure was taking place 
over the last 5 minutes of the trading day (see Kappou et al, 2010). The results of this 
study show not only that the overall level of the close-to-close abnormal return for the 
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event date has diminished in absolute terms relative to previous studies (0.53% as 
shown in Exhibit III), but also that it is statistically significant and positive in the pre-
2008 period (just under 1% as shown in Exhibit IV) and statistically insignificant and 
negligible in the post-2008 period (-0.10%, as shown in Exhibit V). In other words, a 
negligible close-to-close abnormal return during the event date for the post-2008 
sample provides evidence of smoother rebalancing mechanisms by banks’ program 
trading desks, and indicates that passive end-investors are not affected from the price 
pressures of the rebalancing orders that goes into the closing auction.  
 
To summarize the findings, the above analysis argues about i) increased market 
efficiency (as the positive and significant overnight return from AD close to AD+1 is 
non tradable, and there is only a mild correction the day after), ii) reduced interest in 
the “S&P” game by active traders (since the abnormal returns during the days 
between the morning of AD+1 and ED are low and no longer statistically significant) 
and iii) improved, smoother rebalancing mechanisms and better execution algorithms 
by banks’ client facing desks on behalf of passive investors, but only for the post-
financial crisis sample (due to the insignificant and non-existent abnormal returns on 
the event date). The third finding is of great importance as it could also support the 
argument that the post-crisis regulatory framework, may have helped to an extent in 
achieving better services for passive investors. In particular, the imposed restrictions 
on banks’ balance sheets may have prevented banks from taking large trading bets 
and may have removed potential conflicts of interest between banks’ orders and client 
orders (execution orders), during rebalancing periods.  
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The final part of this study refers to the effects of the inflated added stocks on index 
performance. These effects are not reflected in the reported index value, as the price 
increase is realized before each firm becomes an index member. They can be 
considered as a hidden re-balancing cost, that negatively affects passive index 
performance through time.  
 
The extent to which each added stock inflates the S&P 500 can be calculated by using 
the firms’ overall abnormal performance from the announcement date until the date of 
event, adjusted by the relative market capitalization of the firm versus that of the 
index at the time of inclusion. Market capitalization data are collected from Reuters 
for all firms in the sample, and are used to estimate the weight of each added 
company to the overall index at the time of inclusion. Exhibit VII shows that the 
average index increase on an annual basis over the period of 2002-2013 is just under 
10 basis points per year, indicating a minor effect on long-term index performance. 
When looking at the two subsamples (Exhibit VIII), the average annual cost drops by 
more than half over the post crisis sub-period, providing further evidence of market 
efficiency and better index rebalancing services for passive clients. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
For the last decade, the rapid increase in the efficiency, liquidity and transparency of 
financial markets, the more-informed index fund managers, and the post-crisis 
scrutiny of financial transactions and regulatory restrictions, have changed the 
abnormal return patterns of the added stocks around S&P 500 index re-composition 
events. This study focuses on close-to-close, intraday and overnight abnormal returns 
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to ascertain i) whether there are tradable profits available to active traders ii) whether 
a better market information, a more effective order execution or the post-crisis 
regulatory framework may have improved trading behavior and bank’s client services 
during index rebalancing periods and iii) what is the overall index inflation caused by 
the newly added stocks. The results show that passive investors are currently much 
better serviced with a minimum impact on their portfolio performance. 
 
In particular, the results show for the first time that there are no available tradable 
abnormal returns between announcement and event apart from the effective date. 
When looking at the post 2008 subsample, the abnormal returns on the effective date 
are insignificant, indicating that portfolio rebalancing does not cause any price 
shocks, and hence passive end-investors are better serviced. Overall, the rebalances 
inflate the index only by 9 basis points per year. Lastly, the long-term performance of 
the added stocks indicates a full price reversal, discarding all theories regarding 
permanent price pressure, valuable information content in S&P 500 re-compositions 
and any privileges for index member firms.  
 
Although the strategy of trading index re-balances and in particular, those of the S&P 
500, represents only a very small fraction of the current global proprietary trading 
business, its effectiveness can be easily quantified and was analyzed extensively in 
this study; however, the magnitude by which the new market developments and 
regulatory framework will impact the remaining, more advanced segments of the 
proprietary sector, will only become known overtime… 
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Exhibit I: Average Abnormal Firm Performance upon inclusion –short-term event window 
 
Date	   Abnormal	  Return	   t-­‐statistic	  
AD-­‐15	   0.10%	   0.62	  
AD-­‐14	   -­‐0.03%	   -­‐0.18	  
AD-­‐13	   -­‐0.01%	   -­‐0.07	  
AD-­‐12	   0.10%	   0.80	  
AD-­‐11	   -­‐0.06%	   -­‐0.46	  
AD-­‐10	   -­‐0.24%	   -­‐1.75	  
AD-­‐9	   -­‐0.20%	   -­‐1.43	  
AD-­‐8	   0.29%	   1.67	  
AD-­‐7	   -­‐0.03%	   -­‐0.06	  
AD-­‐6	   0.18%	   0.97	  
AD-­‐5	   0.08%	   0.49	  
AD-­‐4	   0.36%	   2.39*	  
AD-­‐3	   0.06%	   0.45	  
AD-­‐2	   0.07%	   0.51	  
AD-­‐1	   0.02%	   0.13	  
AD	   -­‐0.15%	   -­‐1.02	  
AD+1	   3.01%	   15.93*	  
AD+2	   0.14%	   0.89	  
AD+3	   -­‐0.08%	   -­‐0.50	  
AD+4	   0.06%	   0.30	  
AD+5	   0.25%	   1.18	  
AD+6	   -­‐0.08%	   -­‐0.34	  
	   25	  
AD+7	   0.39%	   0.96	  
ED	   0.53%	   2.86*	  
ED+1	   -­‐0.26%	   -­‐1.73	  
ED+2	   -­‐0.22%	   -­‐1.58	  
ED+3	   -­‐0.26%	   -­‐1.79	  
ED+4	   -­‐0.26%	   -­‐1.99*	  
ED+5	   -­‐0.18%	   -­‐1.24	  
ED+6	   -­‐0.23%	   -­‐1.68	  
ED+7	   0.02%	   0.17	  
ED+8	   -­‐0.07%	   -­‐0.45	  
ED+9	   -­‐0.17%	   -­‐1.30	  
ED+10	   -­‐0.17%	   -­‐1.10	  
ED+11	   -­‐0.13%	   -­‐0.88	  
ED+12	   -­‐0.30%	   -­‐2.09*	  
ED+13	   -­‐0.24%	   -­‐1.63	  
ED+14	   -­‐0.05%	   -­‐0.39	  
ED+15	   -­‐0.11%	   -­‐0.85	  
ED+16	   -­‐0.03%	   -­‐0.20	  
ED+17	   -­‐0.11%	   -­‐0.89	  
ED+18	   -­‐0.21%	   -­‐1.86	  
ED+19	   0.11%	   0.73	  
ED+20	   -­‐0.02%	   -­‐0.15	  
 
 
Notes:  An asterisk denotes statistical significance at 5% level or above.  
 
 
 
Exhibit II: Cumulative average abnormal long-term firm performance upon inclusion 
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Exhibit III: Close-to-close, open-to-close and overnight abnormal returns, whole sample 
 
Whole	  sample	  
period	   AD	   AD+1	   AD+2	   AD+3	   AD+4	   AD+5	   AD+6	   AD+7	   …..	   ED	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Close	  to	  Close	  AR	   -­‐0.15%	   3.01%	   0.14%	   -­‐0.08%	   0.06%	   0.25%	   -­‐0.08%	   0.39%	  
	  
0.53%	  
t-­‐statistic	   -­‐1.02	   15.93*	   0.89	   -­‐0.50	   0.30	   1.18	   -­‐0.34	   0.96	  
	  
2.86*	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Open	  to	  Close	  AR	   -­‐0.12%	   -­‐0.22%	   0.09%	   0.03%	   0.14%	   0.18%	   -­‐0.55%	   0.21%	  
	  
0.08%	  
t-­‐statistic	   -­‐0.95	   -­‐1.61	   0.58	   0.23	   0.75	   0.70	   -­‐1.82	   0.53	  
	  
0.43	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Overnight	  AR	   -­‐0.03%	   3.23%	   0.05%	   -­‐0.12%	   -­‐0.08%	   0.08%	   0.47%	   0.19%	  
	  
0.45%	  
t-­‐statistic	   -­‐0.31	   25.09*	   0.68	   -­‐1.14	   -­‐0.84	   0.66	   2.42*	   1.26	  
	  
4.87*	  
 
Notes: An asterisk denotes statistical significance at 5% level or above. 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit IV: Close-to-close, open-to-close and overnight abnormal returns, 2002- October 
2008 sub-period 
 
Pre-­‐Oct	  2008	  	  
sub-­‐period	   AD	   AD+1	   AD+2	   AD+3	   AD+4	   AD+5	   AD+6	   AD+7	   …	   ED	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Close	  to	  Close	  AR	   -­‐0.19%	   3.28%	   0.28%	   0.20%	   0.34%	   0.56%	   0.07%	   0.59%	  
	  
0.96%	  
t-­‐statistic	   -­‐0.96	   14.26*	   1.46	   1.02	   1.18	   1.83	   0.22	   0.97	  
	  
4.19*	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Open	  to	  Close	  AR	   -­‐0.06%	   0.07%	   0.12%	   0.30%	   0.39%	   0.46%	   -­‐0.52%	   0.29%	  
	  
0.44%	  
t-­‐statistic	   -­‐0.38	   0.37	   0.64	   1.62	   1.54	   1.30	   -­‐1.18	   0.48	  
	  
1.88	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Overnight	  AR	   -­‐0.14%	   3.21%	   0.16%	   -­‐0.10%	   -­‐0.05%	   0.10%	   0.59%	   0.31%	  
	  
0.52%	  
t-­‐statistic	   -­‐0.84	   21.49*	   1.52	   -­‐0.79	   -­‐0.39	   0.67	   2.04*	   1.39	  
	  
4.29*	  
 
Notes: An asterisk denotes statistical significance at 5% level or above. 
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Exhibit V: Close-to-close, open-to-close and overnight abnormal returns, October 2008- 
November 2013 sub-period 
 
Post-­‐	  Oct	  2008	  sub-­‐
period	   AD	   AD+1	   AD+2	   AD+3	   AD+4	   AD+5	   AD+6	   AD+7	   …	   ED	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Close	  to	  Close	  AR	   -­‐0.09%	   2.63%	   -­‐0.03%	   -­‐0.41%	   -­‐0.21%	   -­‐0.10%	   -­‐0.30%	   0.11%	  
	  
-­‐0.10%	  
t-­‐statistic	   -­‐0.41	   8.34*	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐1.53	   -­‐0.80	   -­‐0.34	   -­‐0.85	   0.22	  
	  
-­‐0.34	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Open	  to	  Close	  AR	   -­‐0.20%	   -­‐0.62%	   0.05%	   -­‐0.27%	   -­‐0.09%	   -­‐0.15%	   -­‐0.59%	   0.10%	  
	  
-­‐0.45%	  
t-­‐statistic	   -­‐1.02	   -­‐3.05*	   0.21	   -­‐1.15	   -­‐0.34	   -­‐0.41	   -­‐1.61	   0.20	  
	  
-­‐1.42	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Overnight	  AR	   0.11%	   3.25%	   -­‐0.08%	   -­‐0.14%	   -­‐0.11%	   0.05%	   0.29%	   0.02%	  
	  
0.35%	  
t-­‐statistic	   0.74	   14.28*	   -­‐0.77	   -­‐0.83	   -­‐0.76	   0.26	   1.33	   0.10	  
	  
2.42*	  
 
Notes: An asterisk denotes statistical significance at 5% level or above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit VI: Summary of rebalancing effect  
 
	  
Close	  to	  
Close	  
AR	  on	  AD+1	  
Close	  to	  Close	  
CAR,	  
AD+2	  to	  AD+7	  
Close	  to	  close	  
AR	  on	  ED	  
	  
	   	   	  Whole	  Sample	   3.01%	   0.23%	   0.53%	  
t-­‐statistic	   15.93*	   0.98	   2.86*	  
	   	  
	   	  
	   	  
	   	  Pre-­‐	  Oct	  2008	  
sub-­‐period	   3.28%	   0.87%	   0.96%	  
t-­‐statistic	   14.26*	   3.17*	   4.19*	  
	   	   	   	  
Post-­‐	  Oct	  2008	  
sub-­‐period	   2.63%	   -­‐0.57%	   -­‐0.10%	  
t-­‐statistic	   8.34*	   -­‐1.49	   -­‐0.34	  
 
Notes: An asterisk denotes statistical significance at 5% level or above. 
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Exhibit VII: The effects of index re-compositions on the overall index performance on an 
annual basis– whole sample 
 
Year	   Number	  of	  events	   Inflation	  rate	  
2002	   19	   0.30%	  
2003	   8	   0.00%	  
2004	   14	   0.04%	  
2005	   17	   0.05%	  
2006	   25	   0.19%	  
2007	   32	   0.09%	  
2008	   36	   0.16%	  
2009	   22	   0.05%	  
2010	   15	   0.11%	  
2011	   15	   0.05%	  
2012	   14	   0.01%	  
2013	   11	   0.03%	  
Totals	   228	   1.09%	  
Average	  annual	  
cost	  
	  
0.09%	  
 
 
 
 
Exhibit VIII: The effects of index re-compositions on the overall index performance on an 
annual basis– two sub-samples 
 
 
Sample	  Period	   	  
Average	  Annual	  
Cost	  
	  
2002-­‐2008	   	  
	  
0.12%	  
2008-­‐2013	   	   0.05%	  
 
